



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

44

FILE:

Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER

Date:

IN RE:

Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for permission to reapply for admission after removal was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Ecuador who was present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole on or about January 15, 1993. On August 18, 1998, an Immigration Judge found the applicant removable from the United States and granted him voluntary departure until December 16, 1998, in lieu of removal. The applicant failed to surrender for removal or depart from the United States and is therefore inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). He seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to remain in the United States and reside with his U.S. citizen spouse.

The Director determined that the unfavorable factors in the applicant's case outweighed the favorable factors, and denied the Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission After Removal (Form I-212) accordingly. *See Director's Decision* dated November 14, 2003. A Form I-212 was previously filed on October 20, 1999, and was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center on January 20, 2000. An appeal and a motion to reopen were subsequently dismissed by the AAO.

Section 212(a)(9). Aliens previously removed.-

(A) Certain alien previously removed.-

....

(ii) Other aliens.- Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

- (I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or
- (II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an aliens convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception. – Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the aliens' reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign continuous territory, the Attorney General has consented to the aliens' reapplying for admission.

A review of the 1996 IIRIRA amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission, reflects that Congress has (1) increased the bar to admissibility and the waiting period from 5 to 10 years in most instances and to 20 years for others, (2) has added a bar to admissibility for aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, and (3) has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted. It is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping

aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and/or from being present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole.

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis of deportation; the recency of the deportation; the length of legal residence in the U.S.; the applicant's moral character and his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; the applicant's family responsibilities; and hardship to if the applicant were not allowed to return to the U.S.

*Matter of Lee*, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978) further held that a record of immigration violations, standing alone, did not conclusively support a finding of a lack of good moral character. *Matter of Lee* at 278. *Lee* additionally held that,

[T]he recency of deportation can only be considered when there is a finding of poor moral character based on moral turpitude in the conduct and attitude of a person which evinces a callous conscience [toward the violation of immigration laws] . . . . In all other instances when the cause of deportation has been removed and the person now appears eligible for issuance of a visa, the time factor should not be considered. *Id.*

In *Tin*, the Regional Commissioner noted that the applicant had gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present in the U.S. The Regional Commissioner then stated that the alien had obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this country, and he concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would be a condonation of the alien's acts and could encourage others to enter without being admitted to work in the United States unlawfully. *Id.*

The court held in *Garcia-Lopes v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Carnalla-Nunoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998) need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. Moreover, in *Ghassan v. INS*, 972 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that giving diminished weight to hardship faced by a spouse who entered into a marriage with knowledge of the alien's possible deportation was proper.

The applicant in the present matter entered the United States without inspection on or about January 15, 1993, was granted voluntary departure on August 18, 1998, and married his present spouse on August 27, 1998. He now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity.

On appeal counsel asserts that the decision of the Director was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion and erroneous as a matter of law. Counsel further states that the negative factors mentioned by the Director specifically the allegations of "sham" marriage, were unproven allegations and should not be considered in

rendering a determination on the application. Furthermore counsel states that the applicant has been present in the United States for over ten years and he is a person of good moral character.

Counsel assertions are not supported by any documentary evidence or further explanation. The record reveals and the applicant admitted that he had agreed to pay an individual a fee of \$3,000 to arrange a marriage with an individual who posed as a U.S. citizen. After his marriage with this individual on December 6, 1996, he applied for adjustment of status. During a sworn statement taken on July 22, 1997, the applicant admitted that after the wedding he and his spouse never lived together, they never consummated the marriage and the individual who arranged the marriage helped prepare fraudulent documents for him to present with his application for adjustment of status. On July 22, 1997, the District Director, New York, denied the applicant's application for adjustment of status because he was found to have entered into a marriage for the primary purpose of circumventing the immigration laws of the United States.

The AAO finds that the favorable factors in this case are the absence of a criminal record, the applicant's family tie in the United States, his U.S. citizen spouse, the approval of a alien relative petition and the letters of recommendation.

The AAO finds that the unfavorable factors in this case include the applicant's illegal entry into the United States in January 1993, his failure to depart the United States after he was granted voluntary departure, his first marriage for the primary purpose of circumventing the immigration laws, his employment without authorization and his lengthy presence in the United States without a lawful admission or parole. The Commissioner stated in *Matter of Lee, supra*, that residence in the United States could be considered a positive factor only where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. His equity, marriage to a U.S. citizen, gained after a voluntary departure order was issued can be given only minimal weight. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that the applicant is eligible for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.